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ABSTRACT
This paper develops four propositions that show that changes in the global job market for science
and engineering (S&E)  workers are eroding US dominance in S&E, which diminishes comparative
advantage in high tech production and creates problems for American industry and workers:
  (1) The U.S. share of the world’s science and engineering graduates is declining rapidly as
European and Asian universities, particularly from China, have increased S&E degrees while US
degree production has stagnated.
2) The job market has worsened for young  workers in S&E fields relative to many other
high-level occupations, which discourages US students from going on in S&E, but which still has
sufficient rewards to attract large immigrant flows, particularly from developing countries. 
3) Populous low income countries such as China and India can compete with the US in high
tech by having many S&E specialists although those workers are a small proportion of their work
forces.  This threatens to undo the “North-South” pattern of trade in which advanced countries
dominate high tech while developing countries specialize in less skilled manufacturing.
4) Diminished comparative advantage in high-tech will create a long period of adjustment
for US workers, of which the off-shoring of IT jobs to India, growth of high-tech production in
China, and multinational R&D facilities in developing countries, are harbingers.
To ease the adjustment to a less dominant position in science and engineering, the US will
have to develop new labor market and R&D policies that build on existing strengths and develop
new ways of benefitting from scientific and technological advances in other countries.
Richard B. Freeman




For the past half century the US has been the world scientific and technological leader and
the pre-eminent market economy.  With just 5% of the world’s population, the US employs nearly
one-third of the world’s scientific and engineering researchers, accounts for 40% of research and
development (R&D) spending, publishes 35% of science and engineering (S&E) articles, obtains
44% of S&E citations, and wins numerous Nobel prizes.
1  Seventeen of the world’s top 20
universities are American.
2  Indicative of US leadership, international students and scholars flock
to the country to enhance their skills and collaborate with American researchers. 
Leadership in science and technology gives the US its comparative advantage in the global
economy. US exports are disproportionately from sectors that rely extensively on scientific and
engineering workers and that embody the newest technologies.  In 2003, with a massive national
trade deficit, the smallest deficit relative to output  was in high technology industries.   Aggregate
measures of scientific and technological prowess place the US at the top of global rankings.
3
Trade aside, the US is the leading capitalist economy because it applies new knowledge in
more sectors than any other economy.  Many companies on the technological frontier are
American multinationals: IBM, Microsoft, Intel, Dupont, and so on.  Analysts attribute the
country’s rapid productivity growth in the 1990s/2000s to the adaption of new information and
communication technologies to production.  Scientific and technological preeminence is also
critical to the nation’s defense, as evidenced by the employment of R&D scientists and engineers
in defense related activities and in the technological dominance of the US military on battlefields. 
To be sure, other factors also contribute to US economic leadership,
4 but in a knowledge-based
economy, leadership in science and technology contributes substantially to economic success.
This paper presents evidence that changes in the global job market for S&E workers is
eroding US dominance in science and engineering and that the erosion will continue into the2
foreseeable future, diminishing the country’s comparative advantage in high tech goods and
services and threatening the country’s global economic leadership.  The paper assesses policies
that could smooth the transition from the US being the superpower in science and engineering to
being one of many centers of excellence.
The analysis can be summarized in four propositions, two relating to the job market for
scientific and engineering talent, and two relating to the effects of that market on the economy. 
The propositions regarding the science and engineering (S&E ) job market are:
  (1) The U.S. share of the world’s science and engineering graduates at all degree levels is
declining rapidly, as college enrollments have expanded in other countries.  The number of S&E
PhDs from European and Asian universities, particularly from China, has increased while the
number from US universities has stagnated.  International students have, in addition, increased
their share of advanced S&E degrees from US universities.  As a result US reliance on foreign-
born scientists and engineers has increased.   
2) The job market for young scientists and engineers in the US has worsened relative to job
markets for young workers in  many other high-level occupations, which discourages US students
from going on in these fields.  At the same time, rewards are sufficient to attract large immigrant
flows, particularly from less developed countries. 
The propositions regarding the impact of changes in the supply of science and engineering
talent on the country’s economic performance are:
3) By increasing the number of scientists and engineers, highly populous low income
countries such as China and India can compete with the US in technically advanced industries
even though S&E  workers are a small proportion of their work forces.  This threatens to undo the
traditional “North-South” pattern of trade in which advanced countries dominate high tech while3
developing countries specialize in less skilled manufacturing. 
4. Diminished comparative advantage in high-tech will create adjustment problems for US
workers, of which the offshoring of IT jobs to India, growth of high-tech production and exports
from China, and multinational movement of R&D facilities to developing countries, are
harbingers.  The country faces a long transition to a less dominant position in science and
engineering associated industries, for which the US will have to develop new labor market and
R&D policies that build on existing strengths and develop new ways of benefitting from scientific
and technological advances in other countries.
The rest of the paper presents the evidence and arguments for the four propositions and
examines the implications for policy.  
Proposition 1: The US’s share of the world’s S&E work force is declining rapidly.
The US share of the world’s S&E  workers was disproportionately high in the latter half of
the 20
th century for historical reasons that include: the flight of many leading European scientists
from the Nazis; the slow post-World War II recovery of higher education and science in Europe,
which had dominated science before the War; the rapid expansion of mass college education in the
U.S. in the 1950s and 1960s; increased US spending on R&D and doctorate S&E education in
response to Sputnik; the concentration of Soviet science and engineering on military technology;
and the destructive effects of the cultural revolution on education in China.  In 1970 US
predominance was such that the country enrolled approximately 30% of tertiary level students in
the world.  Over half  of science and engineering doctorates were granted by US institutions of
higher education.
Since then the rest of the world has begun to catch up with the US in higher education and
in educating S&E specialists in particular.  The number of young persons going to college has4
increased rapidly in other OECD countries and in many less developed countries, particularly
China.   Enrollments in college or university per person aged 20-24 and/or the ratio of degrees
granted per 24 year old and in several OECD countries (Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands,
Norway, Finland, the United Kingdom, and France) exceeded that in the US.
5  In 2001-2002,
UNCESCO data show that the US enrolled just 14% of tertiary level students – less than half the
US share 30 years earlier.
6  In most countries, moreover, a larger proportion of college students
studied science and engineering than in the US, so that the US share of students in those fields was
considerably lower than the US share overall.  In 2000, 17% of all university bachelor’s degrees in
the US were in the natural sciences and engineering compared to a world average of 27% of
degrees, and  to 52% of degrees in China. 
7
At the graduate level, the PhD is the critical degree in science, particularly for advanced
research activities.   Exhibit 1 records the ratios of PhDs earned in science and engineering in
major PhD producing countries relative to the numbers granted in the US from 1975 to 2001 and
extrapolates the numbers to 2010.  PhDs in science and engineering outside the US  rise sharply
whereas the number granted in the U.S. stabilizes at about 18,000 per year.  In 2001 the EU
granted 40% more S&E PhDs than the U.S.  Trend data suggest that the EU will produce nearly
twice as many S&E doctorates as the U.S. by 2010 or so.
But the greatest growth is in China.  In 1975 China produced almost no S&E doctorates.  In
2003, the country graduated 13,000 PhDs, approximately 70% in science and engineering. 
Between 1995 and 2003, first year entrants in PhD programs in China increased six-fold, from
8,139 to 48,740.   At this rate China will produce more S&E doctorates than the U.S. by 2010! 
The quality of doctorate education surely suffers from such expansion, so the numbers should be
discounted to some extent, but as the new doctorate programs develop, the discount factor will5
decline.  
Overall, the U.S. share of world S&E PhDs will fall to about 15% by 2010.  Within the US,
moreover, international students have come to earn an increasing proportion of S&E PhDs.  In
1966, US-born males accounted for 71% of science and engineering PhDs awarded; 6% were
awarded to US-born females; and 23%  were awarded to the  foreign-born. In 2000, 36% of S&E
PhDs went to U.S.-born males, 25% to U.S.-born females and 39% to the foreign-born.
8  Looking
among the S&E fields, in 2002, international students received 19.5% of all doctorates awarded in
the social and behavioral sciences, 18.0% in the life sciences, 35.4% in the physical sciences, and
58.7% in engineering.
9  Since few US students earn S&E PhDs overseas, moreover, the ratio of
S&E PhDs earned by US citizens or residents to those earned by citizens of other countries fell
more rapidly than the ratio of degrees granted by US universities to degrees granted by foreign
universities.
10  
Finally, the foreign-born share of science and engineering degrees earned in the US is also
substantial for master’s and bachelor’s graduates.  For physics, 6% of bachelor’s degrees,  40% of
master’s degrees, and 42% of PhD degrees went to foreign-born students in 2003. 
11 Among
engineers, 42% of master’s degrees and 49% of graduate students (most of whom are non-PhD
students) were foreign-born/held temporary visas in 2001/2002.
12   The US share of world
bachelor’s engineering degrees granted  – the key degree in engineering – dropped in half in the
1990s -- from approximately 12% in 1991 to 6% in 2000.
13  
employment 
The US recruits its graduate S&E work force from three sources: US-born residents who
choose S&E careers, international students who stay in the country after earning US degrees; and
scientists and engineers who earn degrees overseas and immigrate to the country.
14 Exhibit 26
records the number employed in science and engineering occupations from the 1990 and 2000
Censuses of Population and in the 2004 Current Population Survey (CPS), Merged Outgoing
Rotation group files.  The Census data show that in 2000, the foreign-born made up 17% of
bachelor’s S&E workers, 29% of master’s S&E  workers, and 38% of the PhD S&E workforce –
huge increases over the comparable proportions in 1990.  Indicative of the future, the foreign-born
made up over half of doctorate scientists and engineers under the age of 45 in 2000 and
approximately 60% of post-doctorate workers.   Nearly 60% of the growth in the number of PhD
scientists and engineers in the country in the 1990s came from the foreign born.  The CPS data
show comparable percentages of foreign-born for bachelor’s and doctorate degree employees, but
a higher proportion of the foreign born among master’s degree recipients. 
 Since neither the CPS nor the Census ask where someone earned their degree, these data
do not distinguish between international students who chose to stay in the US and immigrants who
come with foreign degrees. At the doctorate level, the Survey of Earned Doctorates shows that
many international students intend to remain in the US to work after they graduate.  This is
particularly true for students from developing countries, where earnings are lower and scientific
facilities are not at US level.  Micheal Finn has estimated that in the 2001 PhD graduates cohort,
71% of foreign-born doctorates remained in the United States for at least 2 years.  This compares
to an estimated stay rate of 49% for the 1989 cohort.  PhDs from China are especially likely to
remain in the country.
15  
But immigrants with foreign degrees are also quite important. The 2000 Census reported a
much higher number of foreign-born S&E workers than did the NSF’s SESTAT data system,
16
because the latter counts foreign-born recipients of US degrees but not immigrants with overseas
degrees between Censal years.
17  Among post doctorate workers, who are a critical input in nearly7
all laboratories, about four-fifths of academic postdoctoral scholars holding temporary visas have
non-US doctorates and around half of all academic postdoctoral scholars have non-US
doctorates.
18   Finally, indicative of the growing reliance on the foreign born, NSF data show that
foreign-born faculty who earned their doctoral degrees at US universities increased in number




Because changes in the supply from one source affects the total number of S&E workers in
the market, those changes necessarily impacts earnings and employment opportunities (Freeman,
1971, 1975, 1976; Borjas, 2003).  An increase in the supply of immigrant S&E workers will, all
else the same, reduce earnings and employment opportunities below what they otherwise would
have been, thus lowering the incentives for persons from that and from other sources to enter the
S&E job market.  The supply of US born/residents, particularly men, to science and engineering
appears to be more responsive to labor market conditions than the supply of the foreign born.  This
reflects the fact that US born have access to other careers in the country, whereas science and
engineering careers may be the only way for many talented foreign-born persons to enter the US
job market.  The ability to recruit international students and immigrant scientists and engineers for
the US S&E job market benefits the country by tapping a large and relatively inexpensive pool of
talent at the cost of reduced incentives for native-born individuals to go on in science and
engineering. 
Trends in demography and in PhD production rates outside the US will reduce the U.S.
share of S&E graduates at all degree levels.  Assuming comparable training and ability around the
world, US firms and universities who seek the most talented people will increase the foreign born8
share of their work forces in the future.  But even with a sizable immigration of foreign-born talent
to the country, the demographic forces will invariably reduce the share of science and engineering
specialists working in the US, which should reduce the country’s dominance of science and
technology.  
Data on publications and citations by country of investigator show that the US
predominance has already begun to drop in many areas.  In spring 2004, the front page of The New
York Times reported a fall in the U.S. share of papers in physics journals while Nature reported a
rise in the share of papers in China.
20  The NSF records a drop in the US share of scientific papers
from 38% in 1988 to 31% in 2001 and a drop in the US share of citations from 52 percent in 1992
to 44 percent.
21  The share of papers counted in the Chemical Abstract Service fell from 73% in
1980 to 40% in 2003.
22 While attention has focused on the increased scientific capability of
China,
23 Latin American countries have also increased their share of science publications.
24  One
aspect of the fall in the US share that has attracted attention is that it has been associated with a
decline in publications in some disciplines  from US-based scientists and engineers (Hicks, 2004). 
As the US share of the world’s S&E specialists falls, it is inevitable that the US share of papers
will fall, but there is no reason for numbers of papers to fall, given the increased numbers of
journals.
25 
Similarly, as the supply of S&E graduates has increased overseas, many high-tech
companies have begun to locate major research installations outside the U.S.  In 2004, the CEO of
Cisco declared that “Cisco is a Chinese company” when he announced that the firm was setting
up its newest R&D facility in China.
26  One of Microsoft’s major research facilities is in Beijing.
OECD data shows a large increase in U.S. outward R&D investment from 1994 to 2000.  A 2004
survey of corporate executives by the Intelligence Unit of The Economist found that the five top9
countries in which firms intended to increase R&D outside of their home country were China, the
U.S., India, the UK, and Germany.  The three most critically important factors cited by executives
when selecting R&D locales were “local R&D expertise in your industry,” followed by
“availability of R&D scientists with appropriate skills,” and “cost of labour of R&D.”
27   As of mid
2004, the Chinese government registered over 600 multinational research facilities in the country,
many from large US multinationals.
28  By contrast, in 1997 China registered less than 50
multinational corporation research centers. 
Proposition 2: Despite perennial concerns over shortages of scientific and engineering
specialists, the job market in most S&E specialties is too weak to attract increasing numbers
of US students.
Every few years or so,  the scientific establishment and/or the top executives from major
high technology firms proclaim that the US has a shortage of S&E workers and call for diverse
policies to attract more Americans into the fields and/or to make it easier to bring foreign S&E
workers into the country. 
Economists have struggled to interpret claims that the U.S. had a shortage of scientific and
engineering workers since the 1950s, when such claims first surfaced.  In any market-clearing
transaction where wages equilibrate demand and supply, there can no “shortage” or “surplus.” 
There is disappointment about the price, either by suppliers (when a  “surplus” reduces prices) or
by demanders (when a “shortage” raises price), that can generate longer run responses in the form
of investment to increase the supply or substitution of alternative inputs for the high-priced input. 
Arrow and Capron interpreted shortages as the result of sluggish wage adjustments.  Stigler
interpreted them as reflecting rapid changes in wages.  Freeman stressed the cyclic nature of
shortages and surpluses in the context of a cobweb model of market adjustment.  
Wages are not, however, the only equilibrating force or indicator of the state of the labor10
market.  In the market for researchers, the duration of postdoctoral work before obtaining a full-
time job, the probability of getting an independent research grant, or of landing a tenure track job
at an institution of given quality, etc, are also important mechanisms for market adjustment.  In a
loose labor market, young persons are likely to spend more years as post-docs at low post-
doctorate pay than in a tight labor market.  In 1993 the American Institute of Physics proclaimed
“The Physics Job Market: From Bear to Bull in a Decade: What a difference 8 years makes” and
used a graph that showed fewer new physics doctorates taking post-docs and more getting jobs to
make its point.
29 New PhDs pay close attention to the quality of academic institutions making job
offers.  In a tight market, graduates end up in highly esteemed labs or universities.  In loose
markets, they accept jobs in places judged as lower quality. 
Whichever indicator one examines, the evidence suggests that the job market for most
scientists and engineers in the US has fallen short of the job markets in competitive high level
occupations. Exhibit 3 records levels of pay and rates of change in pay from the Census of
Population.  It shows that scientists and engineers earn less than law and medical school graduate,
and that rates of increase in earnings for science and engineering in the 1990’s fell short of the
rates of increase for doctors and lawyers and for persons with bachelor’s degrees.  
The Census comparisons of the income between S&E doctorates and persons obtaining
medical or law professional degrees understate the lower income associated with the PhD
trajectory.  Doctoral graduate students typically spend 7-8 years earning their PhD – a quarter of
their post-bachelors working life – during which they are paid stipend rates.  In some disciplines,
notably the life sciences, most spend 3 or so years doing postdoctoral work, again at stipend
incomes that fall far below alternative salaries available to bachelors degree holders or those with
professional degrees.  Since postdocs work many hours, their pay is particularly low on an hourly11
basis for someone with their years of education.  Given their lengthy training and post-doctoral
work, many S&E doctorates do not enter the “real job market” until they are in their mid-30s, by
which time many of their undergraduate classmates who chose other careers are well-established
in their work lives.  The comparison with managers with 2 years of post-bachelor’s training does
not adequately reflect the payoff to MBAs since the post-bachelor’s education refers to any sort of
further education, not to that degree.
The differences in the percentage changes in salaries in exhibit 3 show that the doctorate
fields have had smaller gains in salaries than the professional fields and persons with only
bachelor’s training, though the increases are similar or larger than those for the managers with two
years post-baccalaureate schooling, depending on the PhD field.  Smaller increases in pay for
doctorates in general imply that the market for PhDs was falling behind the markets for other
groups of highly educated workers. 
Combining the pay differences between doctorate scientists and engineers and highly
educated workers in other fields together with the difference in years of education and post-
doctorate training produces huge differences in lifetime earnings.  Translating Census of
Population earnings by age group, per the data in exhibit 3, into lifetime incomes, discounted at
5%, biological scientists had lifetime earning on the order of $3 million dollars less over their
lifetime than doctors and 1.8 million dollars less than lawyers.  Doctors and lawyers pay for their
education, while PhD scientists receive fellowships or stipends and rarely pay tuition, though they
often work for their fellowship support, but this hardly equates the lifetime earnings.  Physicists
and mathematicians had higher discounted lifetime earnings than biological scientists, while
engineers had the highest earnings among PhDs, but even those earnings fall considerably short of
the earnings of doctors.   12
Looking beyond salaries, the demographics of the academic job market made it
increasingly difficult for doctorate graduates to obtain faculty jobs even as older scientists retire.  
In 1973, roughly 73% of new PhDs obtained faculty jobs within three years of earning their
degrees.  By 1999,  just 37% of new PhDs obtained faculty jobs within three years of earning their
degrees.   To see how the demographics of the job market operates to determine the probability of
academic employment in the life sciences, I have developed a quantity adjustment model of
demand and supply for new faculty, in which the proportion of post-docs obtaining academic jobs
rather than salary is the chief adjustment mechanism.  The demand side of the model defines the
number of persons employed as faculty as the sum of demand for replacements for retiring faculty
plus demand from growth of faculty, which occurs at r % per year.  I assume steady state so that
the retirement of existing faculty F is just 1/length of time of an academic career, which I take to
be 30 years.  Thus annual demand for new academics is
(1) F/30 + .0r F
On the supply side, there are PD postdoctoral recipients, with postdoctoral awards that last 3 years,
so the supply of post-docs to the academic job market is PD/3.  In the steady state one-third of
post-docs will complete their three year award and enter the job market.  Letting b measure the
proportion of post-docs who obtain academic jobs, the supply of new academics is:
(2)  bPD/3
Setting (1) = (2), the market clearing proportion of post-docs who obtain academic jobs is:
(3) b =   F/(10 PD)  +3(.0r) F/PD = (1/10 +.0r) F/PD.
Exhibit 4 shows that the ratio of postdoctoral students to tenured faculty rose greatly from
1987 to 1999 to reach 0.77, which gives a ratio of F/PD of 1.30.  This implies that if faculty jobs
were unchanged (r=0), just 13% of post-docs would find faculty positions (1.30/10).  Even if the13
number of faculty jobs increased at 5% per year, just 20% of the post-docs would find faculty jobs. 
The implication is clear: a much smaller proportion of life science post-docs will move into
academic jobs in the future than in the past. Universities and principal investigators therefore have
a responsibility to prepare life science PhDs and post-docs for jobs outside of the standard
academic track.   Since post-docs are less common and the ratio of post-docs to faculty much
smaller outside of the biological sciences , the potential for obtaining academic jobs is much
higher.  Still, the model identifies the factors that will determine the academic market in those
fields as well – the rate of growth of new demand, retirements, and the ratio of graduates to
faculty. 
Finally, because NIH grants are awarded to faculty members rather than to post doctorate
scientists, the probability that young scientists obtain grants to work as independent investigators
has fallen to negligible numbers.  Exhibit 5 uses NIH data on the age distribution of recipients of
R01 grants, and the age distribution of doctorate life scientists to show how the chances young
investigators would get their own grants fell sharply in the past 20 or so years.  These data  show
that the proportion given to scientists less than 35 years old fell from 20% in 1980 to 4% in 2002
whereas the proportion of grants going to scientists aged 45 years and older rose from 22% to
60%.  Dividing these proportions by the proportion of doctorates in the relevant age brackets gives
the relative odds of obtaining an R01 grant.
30 The relative odds drop from 1.21 to 0.30 for
scientists less than 35 years old.  In 1980 they had a greater chance of getting an award than older
scientists, whereas in 2002 they had a much smaller chance. The relative odds rises for the oldest
age group of scientists.
job market for bachelor’s and master’s graduates
Is there any evidence of shortages in the job market for bachelor’s or master’s graduates in14
science and engineering?
The BS in engineering is the key terminal bachelor’s degree for scientists and engineers. 
S&E employment in industry consists largely of bachelor’s engineering graduates.  Since the end
of world war II, the job market for engineers has shown cyclic oscillations of the cobweb variety.
(Freeman, 1971, 1975, 1976).  Exhibit 6 shows the variation in numbers enrolled as first year
engineering students from 1946 to 2001.  Tight labor markets generate large increases in supply
that depress the labor market approximately 4-5 years later.   Similar patterns are observed in other
fields.  Starting salaries show that engineers make more than other bachelor’s graduates, with
however marked differences among specialties depending on how the industries that typically hire
a given specialty are doing and the number of graduates.  Cycles aside, the proportion of the work
force in engineering has trended upward, from 0.9% of the work force in 1950 to 1.8% in 2003.
31 
Engineering is the largest S&E occupation, by far. 
Scientists and engineers traditionally have low rates of unemployment and reasonably
secure job prospects.  But in 2003 the unemployment rate for U.S. electrical and electronics
engineers (Ees) rose to a record 6.2 percent, which exceeded the average unemployment rate for
all workers of 5.6 percent in that year.
32   The 2003 jobless rate for computer scientists and systems
analysts also reached an all-time high of 5.2 percent.  Both unemployment rates fell thereafter,
though not to historically low levels.  Since many engineers who lose jobs are likely to find other
work relatively quickly – outside the field and probably at reduced earnings –  the unemployment
rate understates the weakness and risk involved in the job market for some specialties.  A more
striking indication of the weakness and risk in this job market is that between 2000 and 2002 the
Bureau of Labor Statistics reduced its projections of the growth rate for employment of computer
specialists (and mathematical scientists, a much smaller group) by one half.
33  It projects about a15
million fewer jobs in this area in the next decade than it had previously.  The reason appears to be
the growth in off-shoring computer work.  This change in market prospects highlights the riskiness
of S&E work in a global economy where other countries are producing many highly skilled
substitutes for U.S. workers.
Exhibit 2 showed a huge flow of immigrant scientists and engineers with less than
doctorate degrees.  Some of this flow occurred as a result of the issuance of H1-B visas during the
dot.com boom, when many high-tech firms complained about labor market shortages. But most
was generated by normal immigration patterns.  Given much larger numbers of engineering
graduates in foreign countries, with huge increases in graduates in India and China, the pool of
potential foreign-born engineers is certain to increase.  Although only a minority of these
graduates are likely to be suitable for the work performed by major multinational firms, even a
modest proportion of the increased supply will give more firms the choice between hiring
immigrant engineers and scientists in their US facilities or hiring foreign-born specialists in their
own countries.  
If the labor market measures show that the job market for scientists and engineers has been
relatively weak, what explains the large influx of international students and scientists and
engineers from overseas into the country?   
One reason that foreign born students and degree recipients are attracted to science and
engineering work in the US while many US citizens or permanent residents do not find that work
attractive is that the foreign-born have lower opportunity costs from other specialties than do
Americans.  The higher average incomes in the US, particularly compared to developing countries,
and the greater dispersion of earnings in the US, particularly compared to other high income
countries, means that US students, particularly the most able, have more lucrative non-S&E16
options than do foreign-born students.  To many foreign-born students or workers, obtaining an
S&E education or job is their ticket to the US job market, a green card, and possible citizenship. 
Their opportunities in their native country outside of science and engineering are far less attractive
than are the opportunities outside of science and engineering to comparable Americans.
Even the 1995-2004 doubling of the R and D budget for NIH did not improve the well-
being of new investigators enough to attract as many US students as foreign students into post-
doctorate positions in the bio/medical sciences.  From 1995 to 2002, the number of Americans
accepting postdoctoral positions in the biological sciences barely changed while the number of
foreign-born PhDs accepting postdoctoral appointments in the biological sciences increased. In
medical and other life sciences (which the NSF data differentiate from biological sciences), the
number of citizens/permanent residents accepting post-docs increased modestly while the number
of foreign-born post-docs grew by over 50%  As a result, the foreign-born share of postdoctoral
appointments in biological  science and medical/other life sciences rose from 48.0% (1995) to
54.7% (2002).
34  At NIH itself – the largest single employer of scientists in bio-medical research –
46% of the doctoral level staff were foreign-born and 58% of the postdoctoral workers were
foreign-born as of October, 2004.  And a substantial number of U.S. passport holders at the
doctoral staff level at NIH were themselves naturalized immigrants.
35
Women and minorities
While proportionately fewer US men have chosen science and engineering careers, more
women and under represented minorities have chosen to major in science and engineering as
undergraduates and to go on to master’s and doctorate degrees.  As a result the proportion of
bachelor’s, masters, and doctorates degrees awarded to women and minorities in science and
engineering fields has trended upward from the 1970s through the early 2000s, albeit at different17
rates in different fields (Chang, Chiang, Freeman). In 2004, women won 55% of National Science
Foundation Graduate Research Fellowships.  The increased numbers of women earning science
and engineering doctorates is due more to increases in the  numbers of women obtaining
bachelor’s degrees in these fields than to increases in the propensity of female bachelor’s
graduates to go on to PhDs. With women earning 57% of all bachelor’s degrees in the early 2000s
and making up 63% of US persons taking the Graduate Record Exam, the proportion of women
with science and engineering degrees is likely to continue to rise.  Universities and other
employers will have to find ways to make careers in scientific work more consistent with women’s
role in  family life, particularly child-bearing and child-rearing, if the country is going to use this
new source of talent optimally.
The increase in the number of under represented minority groups going on in science and
engineering is substantial as well.  In 1976 blacks and Hispanics earned barely 2% of S&E PhDs
granted to US citizens or residents, whereas in 2001 they earned nearly 10% of S&E PhDs granted
to US citizens or residents (Chang, Chiang, Freeman). 
Why have women and minorities chosen to enter science and engineering whereas white
men have shifted to other fields?  
There are two possible explanations. The first is that the proportions of women and
minorities in science and engineering in the past was low because S&E did not readily welcome
them – implicit or explicit discrimination.  The supply of women and minorities was constrained or
discouraged.  The increased proportions are thus a movement toward a new equilibrium that more
properly reflects interests and talents.  The second is that the opportunity cost for women and
minorities is lower due to less attractive opportunities in other high level occupations.  For women,
the large increase in the numbers in medical and law schools argues against this factor  being as18
important as the national effort to equalize opportunities and increase diversity in S&E fields.
Whatever the particular causes, it is striking that without an overall improvement in the overall
S&E job market, more women and minorities have obtained S&E degrees and entered S&E
occupations.
Reconciling the data and the shortage claims
Since labor market measures show no evidence of shortages of S&E workers, is there any
way to make sense of continued claims that the US has a shortage of scientists and engineers and
of calls for more young Americans to enter these fields rather than others?  How can there be a
shortage which does not show up in the job market – a shortage that is not a shortage?
One interpretation of the continual claims of a shortage is that they are disingenuous. 
Firms benefit from a greater supply of scientists and engineers at given wage rates, or better yet, at
lower wage rates.  H1-B visas allowed firms to hire trained specialists without the pay rises that
would be necessary to attract more US workers.  Foreign-born students and post-docs allow
principal investigators to produce research at relatively low cost. The greater the supply of post-
docs at current pay, the more cost-effective is US research spending.  In the 1980s, NSF forecast
shortages of scientists and engineers with the seeming goal of increasing supplies so that US firms
could hire scientists and engineers at lower wages. Congressional Hearings, which highlighted
these forecasts, produced editorials in Science and Nature, and an apology from NSF that has
made all analysts dubious of shortage claims (Weinstein).
A second interpretation, which I think more accurately captures current concerns, is that 
the US has an adequate supply of scientists and engineers only because of the sizeable influx of
foreign-born students and employees.  If US economic growth and comparative advantage depend
substantially on the work of scientific and engineering workers, relying so much on foreign born19
supplies could be risky.  Any interruption or change in the flow of immigrant scientists and
engineers would certainly harm US research and development.  Imagine NIH without foreign-born
post-docs and scientists.  Imagine the labs at any major university or high tech firm without
foreign-born students.  Half of the benches would be empty.  From this perspective, the call for
more US students to go into science and engineering reflects a belief that the balance between the
supply of US born and of foreign-born scientists and engineers may have tilted too much toward
the latter.  It is not a shortage of scientists and engineers but of US entrants into the field.  But
many of the persons and firms who make these arguments do not face up to the potential trade-off
issue: that to attract more US citizens, earnings and employment opportunities have to get better,
which is difficult to effectuate as long as the country can attract many scientists and engineers
from overseas at current wages and employment opportunities..
Proposition 3: Technological Edge and Global Competition When Numbers Count
Trade models designed to explain the extensive trade among advanced countries with
similar factor endowments posit that the trade occurs because countries gain advantages from
being the first-mover on new technologies, which require R&D resources, and/or from increasing
returns, say through learning as output increases or through positive spillovers from one firm in a
sector to another.  In these models countries make their comparative advantage by investment
decisions and  technological prowess.  The Ricardian model developed by Gomory and Baumol
presents this analysis in a particularly useful way.  In their multi-sector model, advanced countries
compete for the most desirable industries.
36  There are many possible free trade equilibrium, some
more beneficial to a given country than others, so that gains to one country can come at the
expense of a competitor. If country A gains an edge in a particular industry in which countries A
and B are competing, A can obtain higher GDP while B ends up with lower GDP because it has to20
shift resources to lower valued sectors.  In this model and others of its ilk, advanced countries
compete with advanced countries in technology (and other societal attributes), but not in low cost
labor.  By contrast, trade between advanced countries and developing countries depends on
differences in factor proportions and invariably benefits both countries.  Countries with similar
factor proportions have potential conflicting national interests in their industrial output of traded
goods while countries with different factor proportions do not face such conflicts. 
The North-South version of the trade model postulates that the advanced area (the North)
has the skilled work force and R&D capability to innovate new goods and services, while the less
advanced area (the South) cannot compete in these areas (Krugman, 1979).  As a result the North
innovates new goods and trades them with the South, which produces older goods as it gains the 
technology do so.  Once the two regions have access to the same technology, the lower wage
South produces the good or service.  Workers are higher paid in the North than in the South both
because they are more skilled and because the North has a monopoly on the new products.  More
rapid technological advance increases wages in the North relative to wages in the South while
more rapid diffusion of technology has the opposite effect.
37  In these and other trade models, a
country benefits when a trading partner or potential trading partner improves technology in a
sector in which the country does not compete, but loses when another country improves its
technology in a country’s export sector.  It is good for Alaska if El Salvador improves the
technology of banana production, but bad for Nicaragua, since the improved technology will lower
cost, increase banana production, and reduce the price of bananas on world markets.  The South
competes with the North for production of older products through low wages but is unable to
compete in the newest technology. 
The increased supply of scientific and engineering workers, including doctorate researchers21
and others able to advance scientific and technological knowledge in large developing countries,
threatens to obsolesce this vision of trade between advanced and developing countries.  It creates
the possibility of  human resource leapfrogging, in which large populous developing countries
employ enough scientists and engineers to compete with the advanced countries in the high-tech
vanguard sectors that innovate new products and processes and thus to threaten the North’s
monopoly in these sectors.  
Three factors are necessary for human resource leapfrogging to shift the comparative
advantage in high tech industries from the North to the South: 
1. The Southern country must be sufficiently populous that it has large numbers of S&E
workers even though it deploys only a relatively small proportion of its work force in those fields. 
From the perspective of the US, there are only two countries with sufficiently large populations
that they could develop larger S&E work forces than the US: China and India; 
2.  Research and development productivity depends on the number of scientific and
engineering workers applied to a problem.  This seems plausible as a broad generalization.  The
firm or country that allocates, say, 2,000 engineers to a project is likely to beat the firm or country
that allocates 1,000 engineers to the same project.  But the way a country organizes its R&D and
the connection between research activities and business is also likely to affect productivity.  The
close ties between US universities and business and the well-developed system of competition for
research funding arguably gives the US an advantage in turning research input into useful
commercial output. Still, eventually numbers may dominate organization. 
3. The South has the production competence to develop leading edge commercial products
even though the bulk of the Southern work force is less skilled and the South lags behind the North
in infra-structure.  Again, this is most likely in highly populous countries that could recruit a22
substantial work force with any skill mix from its huge pool of workers and could develop the
appropriate infrastructure in selected areas. 
Under these circumstances, a populous developing country could compete in high-tech
sectors and do what the North-South trade models have assumed  the South could not do: compete 
effectively in R&D intensive high tech industries.  Even if the developing country had somewhat
lower quality scientists and engineers or lacked some infrastructure that gave its laboratories lower
productivity than those in advanced countries, it would have a cost advantage in R&D in terms of
lower wages for scientists and engineers, and would be able to employ less costly production labor
to produce the relevant commercial products.  The promise by Cisco to move its contract
manufacturers to China as it developed research facilities in China presumably reflects more than
the request of Chinese leaders, per the Chambers quote in endnote 26, but also the potentially
lower cost of producing in China.  
Loss of comparative advantage in the high-tech sector to a low wage competitor can
substantially harm an advanced country.  The advanced country would have to shift resources to
less desirable sectors, where productivity growth through learning is likely to be smaller.  Wages
and living standards would remain high in the advanced country because of its skilled work force
and infrastructure.  But the monopoly rents from new products or innovations would shift from the
advanced country to the poorer country.  The magnitude of the loss would depend in part on the
number of persons working in the advanced sector, and their next best alternatives.   If the low
wage country were to use its scientists and engineers to take a global lead in space exploration,
there would be little impact on the economy of the advanced country.  The first human on Mars
would speak Chinese or Hindi rather than English.  Students interested in space exploration might
flock to the low wage country to learn from the new scientific leaders. US universities might23
contract or close their space science departments, but the adverse economic effects would be
limited to that field.  
Consider, by contrast, what would happen if the low wage country deployed its scientists
and engineers to take a global lead in sectors with sizeable employment and significant through-
put to the rest of the economy.  In this case, the economic losses to the advanced country could be
substantial.  They would be larger than those that might occur if the advanced country lost its
technological advantage to an equally advanced competitor because wages would have to fall more
to make another sector competitive with the low wage competitor.
38  In the extremum, if the only
reason workers in the North were paid more than those in the South was that the North had a
monopoly in innovating new products, the South would effectively become the North and the
North would become the South, reversing their relative positions in wages.  Technology would be
a gold mine, and whichever country possessed the mine would be wealthier than the other. 
Does the loss of technological advantage to a lower wage country necessarily harm an
advanced country?  Ron Jones and Roy Ruffin point out that under some circumstances the loss of
technological advantage could benefit the advanced country.  In their analysis, the advanced
country has an absolute advantage in all sectors, and a comparative advantage in the high tech
sector.  It loses this comparative advantage so that it is completely wiped out as an exporter of high
tech, so it becomes an exporter of the lower tech product.  But it remains a high wage country and
its living standards rise because the low wage country produces so much of the high tech good at
such low prices that the terms of trade improve for the advanced country with the shift in
comparative advantage.  The US does better by producing apparel than by producing airplanes. 
This scenario seems more of a theoretical curiosum than a realistic representation of the current
economic world.  It occurs only if the advanced country has a large absolute advantage in the low24
technology product, which becomes its new export product, as well as in the high technology
product; and that the large populous country has a work force (presumably measured in effective
skill units) that is “much” larger than that of the advanced country;
39 and does not give the high
tech export sector any of the special features (greater rates of learning and productivity advance or
economies of scale; with high wage jobs) that makes that sector particularly desirable.  Loss of
technological superiority in a particular sector to a low wage competitor might generate benefits
for US consumers, but loss of technological superiority overall is likely to be disastrous for US
workers and firms.
Looking at the technological edge that the US (and other advanced countries) have relative
to developing countries from a different perspective, Donald Davis and David Weinstein argue that
the flow of immigrants and foreign capital into the US reduces US well-being.  With more workers
and capital the US expands the production of the high tech goods in which the country has a
comparative advantage, which drives down the price of those goods, and thus the earnings of
native workers and capital.   In this model, if foreign born workers remain overseas working with
older or less productive technology, they are weaker competitors for American workers and firms. 
The implication is that the US could benefit from lower immigration and capital flows. My human
resource leapfrogging analysis differs from the Davis and Weinstein analysis by making
technological superiority endogenous to the supply of scientists and engineers, rather than an
exogenous given.  My analysis posits that immigrant scientists and engineers improve US
technological competence and thus extend the North’s lead in technology, although their supply
does reduce the earnings or opportunities for American scientists and engineers.  The human
resource leapfrog model further assumes that the US technological superiority erodes as the
foreign countries build up their science and engineering labor supplies, and as multinational firms25
locate where those supplies are cost effective.  From the perspective of US workers, it is better for
US workers to have immigrants use the newest technology in the US rather than having them
develop or use it overseas, where wages and labor standards are lower.  
Real concerns or paranoia: the title question
So, to what extent, if at all, does globalization of the scientific/engineering workforce
threaten US economic leadership?
 While the increase in S&E workers in China, India, and other low wage countries, as well
as in Europe and Japan, is too recent to provide a definitive answer to the title question, several
indicators suggest that the answer is: yes, this form of globalization threatens, for better or worse,
US technological and economic leadership. 
The first indicator is that major high tech firms are locating new R and D facilities in China
and India.  This is not a matter of developing products for the Chinese or Indian markets with little
expectation that the technology will be used for products in advanced countries.  Instead, these
facilities will produce advances that will lead to production in those countries for the global
market.  Microsoft’s Advanced Technology Center, which opened in Beijing in 2003, is expected
to help the company maintain its lead in technology and to develop and test new products.
40
A second indicator is the off-shoring of some forms of skilled work.  If educated workers
in low wage countries can do similar tasks as educated workers in advanced countries, firms will
try to offshore that work to the lower wage locale.  While the US government does not measure the
number of jobs off-shored, business consultants and business leaders indicate that the number is
non-negligible and growing (see Hira and Hira, 2005).  Some experts estimate that on the order of
10%-15% of employment in the US is potentially off-shorable (Bardhan and Kroll, 2003).    For
diverse reasons, India has been the main locale for the off-shoring of high level activity, but26
eventually China will also attract jobs in these areas as well.   Advising companies how to offshore
is itself a growing industry, with management consultants telling firms that they can gain as much
as 40% more in profits from selected activities.  
Third, indices of technological prowess show a huge improvement in the technological
capability of China, in particular.  Between 1993 and 2003, China closed part of the gap between it
and the US and Japan in the Technological Standing Index that the Technology and Policy
Assessment Unit at Georgia Tech has developed for the NSF (see Exhibit 7).
41   In 1993 China
received a 20.7 measure, whereas it was at 49.3.  Consistent with this, the Georgia Tech group
found that China was fourth in the world, after the USA, Japan and Germany, in publications in
four emerging technologies in 1999; while the Nanotechnology Research Institute of Japan
reported in 2004 that China was third and close behind Japan in publications and patents in this
area.
42  In terms of R and D spending on nano, China is fourth after the US, Japan, and the EU
taken as a whole, although monetary comparisons are difficult given differences in prices and
potential effectiveness of research facilities.  
Finally, data on production and exports of  high tech products shows that the improved
capability of China in high technology has begun to show up in production and sales on the global
market.    From 1989 to 2001 the US maintained a 31% share of world production in high tech
industries, as the US economy outperformed the EU and Japan in these areas. But the US market
share of exports fell from 24% to 17%.  The big gainer in the world production and exports was
China.  Between 1989 and 2001 the ratio of China’s high tech output to the US’s high tech output
rose from 7.1% to 27.3%. 
43  The share of electronics, machinery, and transport equipment in
China’s exports increased from 18.1% in 1994 to 42.9% in 2003, with the export shares of office
and data processing equipment (including computers and components) rising the greatest
percentage points. In the first quarter of 2005, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce reported 84
billion US dollars of foreign trade of high-tech products, up 26.2 percent over the same period last
year.
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In sum, research and technological activity and production are moving where the people
are, even when they are located in the low wage “South”.  It is moving to China because China is
graduating huge numbers of scientists and engineers and to India, as well, though more slowly. 
Proposition 4: Adjustment Problems and Policies for a New Era
As the number of scientists and engineers working in foreign countries continues to
increase, the US’s comparative advantage in generating scientific and engineering knowledge and
in the high-tech sectors and products associated with that knowledge will decline.  This will be
good for the world, as the spread of modern technologies to more economies will raise incomes in
low income countries.  Increased numbers of scientists and engineers will stimulate the growth of
scientific and technical knowledge and the rate of technological advance, expanding the global
production possibility frontier.  The US will benefit from the greater advance of new knowledge
and the production of new goods and development of new processes and the reduced costs of
products from innovations and products developed elsewhere.  
But the US will also face economic difficulties as its technological superiority erodes. 
What is good for the world is not inevitably good for the US.  The group facing the biggest danger
from the loss of America’s technological edge are workers whose living standards depend
critically on America’s technological superiority.  The decline in monopoly rents from being the
lead country will make it harder for the US to raise wages and benefits to workers.   The big
winners from the spread of technology will be workers in developing countries, and the firms that
employ them, including many US multinational corporations.  In the long term, the spread of
knowledge and technology around the world will almost certainly outweigh the loss of US
hegemony in science and technology, but the transition period is likely to be lengthy and difficult –
more formidable than that associated with the recovery of Europe and Japan after World War II. 
The more similar the production technologies and composition of output in lower wage countries
becomes to that of the US, the greater will be the downward pressures on US wages.
To minimize the costs of adjustment, the US will have to consider new policies in the labor
market to distribute the national product more equitably and new policies in the market for R&D28
and technology to build on existing strengths that will maintain scientific and technical leadership
in some sectors and to remain close to the frontier in other areas.   The country will also have to
find ways to take scientific and technological advances from other countries and turn them into
commercial products rapidly.
In the scientific and engineering job market, continued growth in the supplies of highly
talented young people will stretch out the transition period and maintain the US as a center of
scientific and technological excellence, albeit a less dominant center. The country could do this in
several ways.   It could continue to encourage large numbers of foreign students and SE
immigrants to study and work in the country, at the cost of depressing incentives for domestic
supply.  If it does this, it ought to think about policies to encourage these students and immigrants
to obtain permanent residence and citizenship quickly, to reduce the danger that they might return
to their origin country and develop industrial activities that compete with those in the US.  At the
same time, the country could seek to increase domestic supplies without discouraging foreign
students and immigrant, by giving more lucrative graduate research fellowships (which go to US
students or residents only) and improving opportunities to do independent research early in a
career, which is likely to increase US supplies more than those from foreign countries.   From
1999 to 2005 NSF increased the value of its Graduate Research Fellowship Award from $15,000
to $30,000.  The number of applicants nearly doubled as well, indicating a high elasticity of supply
to the awards.  But the number of awards has not changed much since the early days of the
programs, so that in the 2000s approximately 1/3rd as many NSF Fellowships were granted per
S&E baccalaureate than in the 1950s-1970s (Freeman, Chang, Chiang).  An increase in the number
of awards at the new value of stipends could substantially increase the supply of citizens choosing
S&E studies.            
On the demand side, the main tool that the US government has to affect S&E intensive
activity is the nation’s government spending on R and D.  Some economists might view any policy
to direct that spending toward creating technological advantage in particular sectors as having the
flavor of an industrial policy (as Japan did with its MITI activity, which means the government29
tries to pick industrial winners or protect losers.  But a  policy for research and development in
new technologies is different than a policy of tariffs or subsidies.  As long as the government is the
main source of support for basic research directly through grants or indirectly through
subsidization of universities, its expenditures already help set the technology and thus economy of
the future.  The doubling of NIH research spending spurred the life sciences, where increased
knowledge will be more beneficial to biotechnical firms and the health industries than to most
others.  The National Nano-tech Initiative will spur engineering and physical sciences, which has
the potential to benefit different sectors of the economy.  On the other hand, a shift in R and D
from areas likely to benefit the civilian economy toward military goals is likely to weaken US
technological superiority in normal economic activity. 
In adjusting to the globalization of science and engineering and the diminishment of US
comparative advantage in high tech sectors, the US has some weaknesses. The country’s social
insurance system is not well-developed for helping workers cope with a potentially long period of
transition.  The country has the lowest safety net for workers and the most expensive employment-
linked health insurance system among advanced countries.  It has done a relatively poor job in
educating lower skill persons and ... you know the litany.  But the country also has some great
strengths for absorbing the loss of technological superiority in at least some sectors.  The high
mobility of the US work force should make some adjustments more palatable than if Americans
were less willing to move location or change their occupation or industry.  American scientists and
engineers collaborate regularly with scientists and engineers in other countries.  American
universities are more closely linked to business and the economy than those in other countries.  
This should enable US higher education  to continue its role in producing knowledge spillovers to
industries in local areas, through spin-offs or other forms of knowledge transfer.  
If the country maintains or improves its efficiency in moving knowledge from university
labs to commercial products, the US comparative advantage in high technology sectors will be
maintained longer than would otherwise be the case.  Speaking with a Harvard physicist, whose
most readily commercializable work was done collaboratively with overseas scientist and30
engineers, I commented, “ah, so you are helping them catch up with us”, to which I received the
reply, “no, they are helping us keep ahead of them”. The reason was that the US side of the
collaboration found it easier to deal with industry and to attract venture capital and business
entrepreneurship.  Empirically, US firms spend more on R and D relative to GDP than do EU firms
and contribute more to university research programs. While there are dangers with business-
university linkages, about which Derek Bok has warned us, these links can help preserve
leadership  innovation and high tech even as the US share of world PhD researchers falls.    31
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EXHIBIT 1: Ratio of # S&E PhDs from Foreign Universities to # from US Universities
(Ratio of PhDs in each year) 1975 1989 2001 2003
a 2010
a
Asia major nations 0.22 0.48 0.96
China na 0.05 0.32 0.49 1.26
Japan 0.11 0.16 0.29
EU major (Fr, Germ, UK) 0.64 0.84 1.07
All EU 0.93 1.22 1.54 1.62
c 1.92
c




a  For 2003 and 2010, ratios calculated using US doctorates at 2001 production level. 
b  ‘diaspora’ includes estimates of Chinese doctoral graduates from UK, Japan, and US (with
temporary visas). US ‘stayers’ include US citizens and permanent residents.
c  EU data extrapolated from earlier years.
Sources: NSF Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, and primary sources referenced therein;
Weiguo and Zhaohui, National Research Center for S&T Development (China) - private
communication. 36
EXHIBIT 2: Trend in Foreign-born Share of S&E Employment
1990 2000 2004
Bachelors 11% 17% 17%
Masters 19% 29% 32%
All PhD 24% 38% 37%
PhDs < 45 27% 52% –
Post-Doc 49% 57% --
 
Source: 1990 and 2000 bachelor’s, masters, PhD and PhDs less than 45 years of age, tabulated from
Census of Population, IPUMS data; Post-Docs from NSF. 
2004 figures tabulated from US Bureau of Census, Current Population Survey, MORG Files.
Post-Doc, NSF, http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind04/c2/fig02-26.xls, where the figures refer to
temporary residents rather than to foreign born   37
EXHIBIT 3: Income in Thousands of Dollars and % Change in Income, 1990-2000
1990 2000 % Change
PhD
     Engineering $64.6 91.1 41.0
     Mathematics 58.3 86.6 48.5
     Natural Science 56.3 73.0 29.7
     Social Science 54.2 74.6 37.6
     Life Science 45.6 62.7 37.5
MD 98.8 156.4 58.3
Lawyer 76.9 114.7 49.2
Managers , college + 2 years 61.3 84.9 38.5
College Grads, 4 years only 30.8 46.9 52.2
Source: Tabulations from US Census of Population, IPUMS Data, 1990, 2000. 38
EXHIBIT 4: Ratio of Number of Postdocs / Number of Tenured Faculty in Life Sciences
Discipline 1987 1999
Postdocs / Tenured % ª
Life Sciences 0.54 0.77 43%
Physical Sciences
     Mathematics 0.20 0.19 -5%
Engineering 0.11 0.16 45%
Source: National Academy of Science, Enhancing the Postdoctoral Experience for Scientists and
Engineers 2000, table B-14. 39
EXHIBIT 5: Younger Scientists Don’t Get NIH Grants
Share of NIH Grants 1980 2001
<35 23% 4%
>45 22% 60%
Relative Odds of Getting NIH, by age (ratio of





NIH: Erica Goldman and Eliot Marshall, “NIH Grantees: Where Have All the Young Ones Gone?”
Science Vol 298 (October 4, 2002). 











 EXHIBIT 6: First Year Enrollments in Engineering Oscillate With Market Conditions, 1946-2001
Source: Engineering Infrastructure Diagramming and Modeling (1986)
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems;  
National Science Foundation, Undergraduate enrollment in engineering and engineering technology
programs 41
Exhibit 7: Technological Standing Index, US, Japan, China, 1993-2003
Source: Georgia Tech Technology Policy and Assessment Center,
http://gtresearchnews.gatech.edu/newsrelease/techexports.htm42
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